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Post-Racial Leadership: Racialized Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Obama
Ian F. Haney López
I. Introduction
President Barack Obama‘s election has inspired many to marvel that we now live
in a ―post-racial‖ America. Obama himself seems to embrace this notion, not
perhaps as a claim about where we are now, but as a political stance that dictates
how best to approach society‘s persistent racial problems. In this essay, I assess
Obama‘s post-racial politics. To do so, I use the lens of racialized mass
incarceration. Because race is so central to the contemporary administration of
criminal justice, it constitutes a particular challenge to the post-racial narrative.
When measured in light of mass of imprisonment, what does the claim to be
post-racial mean? Obama rejects this term as a temporal claim that we have come
to the end of history as far as race is concerned, or as a descriptive claim that race
in the United States no longer corresponds to advantage and disadvantage. ―You
know,‖ the President recently remarked, ―on the heels of [my electoral] victory
over a year ago, there were some who suggested that somehow we had entered
into a post-racial America; all those problems would be solved.‖ Then he
deadpanned, ―That didn‘t work out so well.‖1 The rejection of post-racial as a
temporal or sociological claim seems entirely appropriate, as even the most
cursory engagement with American criminal justice at the start of the twenty-first
century demonstrates. The United States puts people under the control of the
correctional system at an anomalously high rate, shutting behind bars an
overwhelmingly disproportionate number of black and brown persons. A 2009
report shows that one in every 31 adults in the United States is in prison or on
parole or probation; broken down by race, that is one in every 11 African
Americans, one in 27 Latinos, and one in 45 whites.2 Race remains a stunningly
powerful predictor of super- and subordination, ensuring that race has not nearly
played itself out in America‘s long struggle for a more perfect union.
This essay argues that Obama‘s post-racialism, rather than serving as a claim
about our racial present, operates as a political or perhaps even an ideological
approach toward the continuing astringent of race. One can conceptualize
ideologies as normatively laden systems for understanding—and acting in—the
world. To a certain extent, ideational entrepreneurs seeking to preserve or
challenge the status quo forthrightly manufacture such idea systems. When most
successful, however, ideologies achieve the status of common sense. They
become accepted, taken-for-granted matrices that at a non-conscious level provide
baselines for judging what is normal, moral, and legitimate in the world.3
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Ideologies of race in particular typically do so by answering the following
conundrums: First, what is race? Second, what is racism? Finally and most
importantly, what is the relationship between race, racism, and inequality, and by
implication, what—if anything—is morally required of us as a society?
As a framework for comprehending and maneuvering around race, postracialism must be assessed against the dominant racial ideology of our time,
―colorblindness.‖ That comparison forms the heart of this essay. To lay some
groundwork, I first give an overview of contemporary colorblindness and then
assess this racial stance against the rise of racialized mass incarceration, showing
how colorblindness facilitated and today continues to protect this oppressive
dynamic. I then turn to Obama‘s racial politics, starting with his most direct
engagement with race and crime control, the arrest of the prominent AfricanAmerican professor, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Building on this, and drawing on
Obama‘s more general statements on race and politics, I argue that post-racialism
constitutes a liberal embrace of colorblindness. It differs in important particulars,
but nevertheless largely tracks this ideology in a way likely to limit progress
toward increased racial equality.
II. Colorblindness
Given the long, sorry history of racial subordination in the United States, there is
tremendous rhetorical appeal to Justice John Marshall Harlan‘s famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, the case that announced the ―separate but equal‖ standard that
rationalized decades of Jim Crow racial oppression.4 Harlan declared—in what
amounted to aspiration rather than description—that ―[o]ur constitution is
colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.‖5 This utopian
vision of a future society in which race no longer correlates with privilege or
disadvantage, and so carries no meanings tied to established hierarchies, is
powerfully compelling. Yet a sharp distinction must be made between
colorblindness as an ideal and as a current strategy for moving in that direction.
As a policy prescription, colorblindness seems downright perverse. To grasp this
contradiction, consider colorblindness in historical perspective.
Over the course of the twentieth century, colorblindness shifted from being a
progressive demand to a reactionary one. This metamorphosis finds reflection in
the arguments made by Thurgood Marshall the lawyer and Thurgood Marshall the
Supreme Court Justice. As counsel for the NAACP in the late 1940s and early
1950s, Marshall repeatedly encouraged his colleagues to cite Harlan‘s famous
injunction to argue that, as Marshall put it in a 1947 brief to the Supreme Court,
―classifications and distinctions based on race or color have no moral or legal
validity in our society. They are contrary to our constitution and laws.‖6 Marshall
sought to harness colorblindness to attack the racial degradation given
constitutional sanction by Plessy.7 He did so recognizing that racial subordination
relies upon racial distinctions. The use of race, Marshall argued, lacked moral and
legal validity precisely when deployed to oppress.
Rather than adopt a colorblind rule proscribing every use of race, the Supreme
Court opted to dismantle Jim Crow ―with all deliberate speed.‖8 Initially, this
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reflected a decision to temporize. The Court feared taking on too much too
rapidly, and particularly sought to avoid abruptly declaring unconstitutional—and
implicitly immoral—the emotional core of white supremacy, the ban on
interracial marriage. Over time, however, the decision not to flatly prohibit
governmental distinctions based on race came to seem wise. By the mid-1960s, a
simple truth became increasingly apparent to the friends and foes of racial
emancipation alike: segregation readily continued in the presence of formal racial
neutrality. As late as 1965, less than one in one hundred black children in the
South attended schools with whites, and the number of whites in predominantly
black schools was infinitesimal. Civil rights lawyers dropped their demands for
colorblindness and began to stress the necessity of race-conscious remedies to
achieve integration and substantive equality, winning support from the Court in a
series of decisions spanning the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Meanwhile, the opponents of integration became the new patrons of
colorblindness. Thurgood Marshall himself had recognized that while
colorblindness posed a radical demand as a right to be immediately free from all
Jim Crow oppressions, colorblindness as a remedy promised tepid change. It
required only an end to explicitly segregationist laws, not actual remediation of
the harms wrought by racial oppression.9 This insight was scarcely lost on the
opponents of integration. A South Carolina district court articulated the colorblind
counterargument to integration as early as 1955: ―The Constitution . . . does not
require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such
segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of
governmental power to enforce segregation.‖10 From here, it was but a short step
to the contention that colorblindness itself prohibited race-conscious integration
measures. North Carolina grasped this in 1969, passing a law that, ―No student
shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on account of race, creed,
color or national origin.‖11 In 1971, the Supreme Court unanimously struck this
law down, declaring unequivocally that rigid limitations on government efforts to
use race in a remedial fashion had no place under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Seeing through North Carolina‘s stratagem, the Court recognized that, ―the statute
exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assignment plans by
directing that they be ‗color blind‘; that requirement, against the background of
segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board of Education.‖
The Court continued: ―Just as the race of students must be considered in
determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be
considered in formulating a remedy. To forbid, at this stage, all assignments made
on the basis of race would deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely
essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual
school systems.‖12 As the civil rights era drew to a close, colorblindness had
shifted valence, from emancipatory to reactionary.
Although initially rejected by the Court, as its composition changed, so too did
its stance toward reactionary colorblindness. By the end of the 1970s, the rhetoric
of colorblindness had been repurposed as an attack on affirmative action. In 1978,
Justice Marshall found himself urging the Court in its first full affirmative action
case to reject colorblindness: ―It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that
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we now must permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in
making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and
prestige in America.‖13 Marshall did not prevail, either for colorblindness as a
lawyer or against it as a justice. Today, colorblindness as a presumptive bar on
affirmative action has been firmly read into the Constitution. As the nation‘s
political culture swung from defending to dismantling white supremacy,
courtroom proponents of colorblindness shifted from seeking to promote to
seeking to defeat equitable racial change, and it was this reactionary version the
courts ultimately embraced.
III. The Origins of Racialized Mass Incarceration
Contemporary colorblindness arose in opposition to demands for meaningful
structural reform. So too did racialized mass incarceration.14 Sociologists and
political scientists have persuasively argued that mass imprisonment developed
out of a backlash against the civil rights movement. They point to the triumph of
Richard Nixon‘s ―Southern Strategy,‖ whereby the Republican Party gained
ascendance by attracting previously Democratic voters from the South as well as
the working and middle classes nationally through coded appeals to racial fears.
―Crime‖ served as a potent synonym for the threatening presence and demands of
nonwhites.15 ―Nixon‘s strategy was based on the linkages between racial conflict
and lawlessness; indeed, in viewing [one of his own campaign ads], he remarked
triumphantly that it ‗hits it right on the nose. It‘s all about law and order and the
damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there.‘‖16 Rather than challenging this
politics of racial fear mongering, Democratic politicians almost immediately
acceded to it, seeking to ―out-tough‖ Republicans in ―competitive upward bidding
wars over the terms of punishment‖ that over decades created the carceral state
we know today.17 This is not to say that the backlash to civil rights expressed
itself exclusively in terms of imprisonment. On the contrary, reactionary politics
also, and relatedly, targeted the state‘s welfare functions. Nor is this to suggest
that the current carceral system is rooted solely in racial dynamics. Factors
beyond race doubtless also spurred the emergence of crime control as a modality
of governance. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that racialized mass
incarceration finds its origins, as well as a persistent animating force, in racial
politics.
The legislation that laid the groundwork for the ―war on crime‖ first began
appearing in the mid-1960s, a time when the country experienced a metastasizing
sense of social disorder. To a certain extent, popular anxiety about social
disorganization reflected numerous nonracial factors, whether the economy,
protests against the Vietnam war, political mobilization on college campuses, the
counter-culture movement generally, or the sense of social crisis engendered for
many by the demands for women‘s and gay rights. Perhaps most potently, though,
rapidly shifting race relations spurred a sense of social breakdown. Across the
country, political mobilization by multiple nonwhite communities, whether
African American, Latino, Native American, or Asian, destabilized local racial
hierarchies and concomitantly contributed to an escalating sense of social crisis.
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Many elected officials opposing civil rights used the language of law and order
to respond to, and in turn stoke, racial anxiety among whites. Recourse to such
rhetoric partly reflected the ready availability of this frame. From the inception of
the civil rights movement in the 1950s, southern politicians had disparaged racial
activists as ―lawbreakers‖—as indeed they were.18 In the Jim Crow regions,
citizens had long pressed basic equality demands through lawbreaking: sit-ins and
freedom rides purposefully violated segregation statutes in order to challenge
white supremacist social norms. Paradoxically, the very success of the civil rights
movement created an incentive for its opponents to invoke crime tropes. Agitation
for racial justice helped give birth to a national consensus condemning the frank
espousal or brute enforcement of racial hierarchy, even as it generated opposition
and insecurity among whites. With the moral triumph of the movement, such
anxiety could no longer legitimately be expressed in openly racist terms. Quickly
enough, however, political leaders mobilized white opposition to civil rights
through a proxy language: ―crime‖ became a coded vocabulary capable of
marshalling racial fears without violating newly dominant egalitarian norms.
The contest pitting law and order against civil rights found especially
momentous expression in the legislative arena. The 1964 Civil Rights Act
provided a head-to-head showdown, with civil rights advocates eventually
overcoming determined opposition expressed forcefully in the language of crime
control.19 After 1965, however, ―[c]rime became an excuse for not expanding
civil rights and social justice. Civil rights and crime were inversely related on
[Congress‘] agenda; as action on civil rights withered, criminal justice was
expanded.‖20 The crime rhetoric of the mid-1960s evolved into anti-crime
legislation and programs that revolutionized federal, and subsequently state,
approaches to crime control. Federal legislative hearings on crime increased
dramatically, starting in 1968 and staying at historic highs through 2000.21
Federal crime spending increased four fold by 1990 before falling back a bit,22
and state spending on corrections increased three fold between 1980 and 2008.23
The statutory laws that structured racialized mass incarceration seem firmly
rooted in a politics of hostility toward civil rights.
A focus on race and the carceral system remains incomplete, however, without
tying the racial politics of crime to the racial politics of welfare. Beginning in the
1960s, conservative political elites sought to use social anxiety generally and
racial anxiety in particular to gain support for anti-welfare politics. Despite having
been discredited by the Great Depression and repudiated by the New Deal,
libertarianism recrudesced through the semiotics of criminality.24 In stark contrast
to a social consensus dominant since the creation of the modern welfare state that
large-scale forces immune to personal effort largely trapped the poor, the
language of lawbreaking relied on and promoted a social vision of individual
failure rooted in moral depravity. Invocations of criminality conjured the specter
of the undeserving poor.25
On the hustings in 1965, then Speaker of the House and later President Gerald
Ford demanded to know: ―How long are we going to abdicate law and order—the
backbone of any civilization—in favor of a soft social theory that the man who
heaves a brick through your window or tosses a firebomb into your car is simply
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the misunderstood and underprivileged product of a broken home?‖26 ―Crime‖
conjoined minorities and the poor into a single, socially dysfunctional monolith,
beyond the duty of the rest of society to care for and certainly beyond the ability
of government to help. Gerald Ford‘s philippic did not need to emphasize the
racial identity of those who tossed bricks and firebombs and then hid behind the
excuse of broken families. Daniel Moynihan left no doubt about their race in his
famous 1965 report on blacks and welfare:
A community that allows large numbers of young men to grow up
in broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any
stable relationships to male authority, never acquiring any set of
rational expectations about the future—that community asks for
and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disorder, are not only to be
expected, but they are very near to inevitable. And they are richly
deserved.27
Since the late 1960s, Republicans and Democrats have competed to punish
criminals and ―welfare cheats.‖ Posturing through ever-more punitive crime
policies and ever-more restrictive social programs, federal and state party politics
drove mass imprisonment and simultaneously dismantled the social safety net.28
A racialized fear of crime and a racialized distaste for the poor have remained
central elements of American electoral politics for the last four decades. Racial
politics have refashioned the state, building an enormous carceral system while
hamstringing the willingness and even the ability of government to provide for the
health, safety, and welfare of the public.
IV. The Colorblind Endorsement of Racialized Mass Incarceration
Most critiques of colorblindness, like that sketched earlier, focus on its role as a
sword against affirmative action. In the law enforcement context, however,
colorblindness serves more as a shield. In defining as racism any use of race, it
simultaneously defines what counts as ―not-racism‖: all interactions not expressly
predicated on race, no matter how closely correlated with racial hierarchy. A 1987
Supreme Court decision, McCleskey v. Kemp, epitomizes this defensive flip-side
of colorblindness.29 The Court famously shrugged off the most sophisticated and
exhaustive survey of capital sentencing thus far undertaken when it rejected the
claim that racism tainted Georgia‘s death penalty machinery. Though it accepted that
Georgia imposed the ultimate penalty on blacks who murdered whites at twenty-two
times the rate for blacks who killed blacks, the Court nonetheless opined that these
statistics proved ―at most . . . a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race.‖30
McCleskey’s dismissal of the evidence rested on a particular conception of racism
as the episodic expression of individual malice.31 Neither Georgia‘s dual system
of criminal enforcement, stretching back to slavery, nor the undeniable correlation
between the excessive punishment of blacks and the persistence of a white-black
hierarchy mattered to the majority. Ensconced behind colorblindness, the Court
insisted upon exceptionally clear proof of racial bias by a particular bad actor in
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that specific case. The majority reasoned as if racial discrimination did not exist
unless the record included a racial epithet or a confession of evil intent. Absent an
explicit use of race, no basis existed for concluding that the glaring bias in the
Georgia criminal system was ―invidious.‖32
Though McCleskey involved the death penalty, the Court‘s reasoning
specifically encompassed the disproportionate incarceration of minorities. It did
so not as a caution against but as a further spur to the reliance on an exceedingly
narrow conception of racism. According to the Court, ―McCleskey‘s claim, taken
to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie
our entire criminal justice system. . . . [I]f we accepted McCleskey‘s claim that
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could
soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.‖ The dissent
chastised the Court for its ―fear that recognition of McCleskey‘s claim would
open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing.
Taken on its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.‖
Yet injustice is exactly what the colorblind logic in McCleskey rationalized.
Colorblindness as a legal rule makes two moves. The first, and more widely
critiqued, involves opposing every express use of race, now overwhelmingly
confined to remedial efforts. The second, less often noted but key to the criminal
law context, entails upholding as ―not-racism‖ gross racial disparities
corresponding directly to longstanding racial hierarchies, today typical of
structural racism.33
Colorblindness operates hand-in-hand with the crime control system on a
broader cultural level as well. The insistence that race plays no role unless openly
invoked ultimately facilitated the emergence of crime as a proxy language for
race. Fear of crime could serve as a coded sop to white voters only because
colorblindness provided a cover, however thin, for a patently racist narrative.
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva identifies ―cultural racism‖ as a key feature of what he
terms ―color-blind racism‖: ―Cultural racism is a frame that relies on culturally
based arguments such as ‗Mexicans do not put much emphasis on education‘ or
‗blacks have too many babies‘ to explain the standing of minorities in society.‖34
Under the semiotics of colorblindness, only open references to skin color or the
use of explicitly derogatory racial epithets count as racism. In contrast, alarmism
about the cultural or behavioral deficiencies of minorities ostensibly bears no
relation to racism and xenophobia. Recall the evolving vocabularies: superpredators, gang bangers, and welfare queens, or more recently, illegal immigrants
and terrorists. Colorblindness is a form of racial jujitsu. It co-opts the moral force
of the civil rights movement, deploying that power to attack racial remediation
and simultaneously defend embedded racism. It defends racial injustice directly,
for instance by insisting that massive racial disparities are ―not racism.‖ It also
does so indirectly, and perhaps ultimately more powerfully, by providing cover
for racial stereotypes expressed in cultural and behavioral terms, for example
through the imagery of minorities as criminals.
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V. Racialized Mass Incarceration Today
With the blessing of the courts, the disproportionate incarceration of minorities
has continued for four decades. The results, even when expressed in the cold
nomenclature of statistics, are deeply disturbing. Between 1970 and 2003, the
number of people in state and federal prisons serving at least one year behind bars
rose from around 200,000 to 1.4 million.35 At the end of that period, county jails
warehoused another 700,000 persons either awaiting trial or serving sentences of
under a year, while a further 4.7 million persons were on probation or parole.36
Putting these numbers together leads to the harrowing truth that in 2003 the
correctional system held under its coercive thumb more than one in every twenty
adult males in the United States.37 This incarceration rate, the highest in the
world, exceeds the highest rate in Europe by 500 percent.38 The United States has
five percent of the world‘s population, but immures 25 percent of the planet‘s
prisoners.39
This ―rage to punish‖ targets primarily poor African Americans and Latinos.40 It
does not, of course, entirely spare whites, who have also seen their rates of
incarceration rise, if not as precipitously.41 Nevertheless, for poor blacks and
browns—and for poor, young, uneducated black men in particular—a year or more
in prison is now excruciatingly common. The hundred-to-one sentencing disparity
between crack and powder cocaine has emerged as the quintessential example of
how the war on crime, conjoined to race, especially targets blacks.42 Partly as a
result, in 2000, black men were more likely to be in prison or jail (7.9 percent)
than were white men in the high crime ages of twenty to forty who never
completed high school (6.7 percent).43 For young black men who failed to
complete high school, the incarceration rate soared to 32.4 percent, meaning that
at any given point nearly one in three languished behind bars.44 Shifting from the
rate of imprisonment within the population to the risk of incarceration during
adulthood, by 1999, a black man born in the late 1960s had a one-in-five chance
of having gone to prison for at least a year, while for men in that cohort who
dropped out of high school, the risk of imprisonment surged to a staggering 59
percent.45 Note that these last numbers understate the full reach of the criminal
system, as they do not count the hundreds of thousands jailed for less than a
year.46 Nor do they count the dramatic increase in the number of incarcerated
women, again primarily African American: ―[B]etween 1990 and 2000 the
number of women in prison increased by 125 percent, and at the start of the
twenty-first century over 166,000 women were held in U.S. prisons and jails.‖47
Serious time behind bars has become overwhelmingly common, a destructive rite
of passage for many young, disadvantaged nonwhites. It is thus also an
omnipresent torsion on families and neighborhoods, an implacable pressure on
poor communities of color. The crime control system, as Glenn Loury argues, is a
―monstrous social machine that is grinding poor black communities to dust.‖48
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VI. The President’s Response
President Obama has been slow to address the grim reality superficially captured
in the statistics on racialized mass incarceration. He was, though, perhaps too
quick, in his own estimation, to respond to the arrest of the prominent AfricanAmerican professor, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.49 Gates, an internationally renowned
Harvard faculty member and public champion of improved race relations, was
arrested for disorderly conduct while at his home. Returning from a trip abroad on
a Thursday in mid-July 2009, he initially had trouble opening his front door. A
cautious neighbor called the police to report seemingly suspicious activity, though
by the time the police arrived, Gates had secured access through the back entry
and had managed to work open the front door. Sergeant James Crowley, a white
police officer, questioned Gates, eliciting not only proof that Gates was in his own
home, but an upbraiding for the interrogation. A verbal altercation ensued, with
Gates alleging that the officer acted in a demeaning way and Crowley claiming
that the professor was ―tumultuous‖ in his conduct. Whatever the details, Crowley
placed Gates under arrest for disorderly conduct, taking him in handcuffs to the
local police station where he was held for four hours. The following Tuesday,
amid swirling national attention, the Cambridge, Massachusetts, police dropped
the charges against Gates.
On Wednesday, in a press conference otherwise dedicated to health care reform,
Obama fielded a question about Gates arrest. After noting that he personally knew
Gates and considered him a friend, Obama responded as follows:
Now, I don‘t know, not having been there and not seeing all the
facts, what role race played in that, but I think it‘s fair to say,
number one, any of us would be pretty angry; number two, that the
Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there
was already proof that they were in their own home; and, number
three, what I think we know, separate and apart from this incident,
is that there is a long history in this country of African-Americans
and Latinos being stopped by law enforcement disproportionately.
And that‘s just a fact.50
A political firestorm immediately enveloped Obama, with some charging him
with inappropriately taking sides and even of being racist. Before considering
Obama‘s response to this yowling, however, note the cautious substance of his
remarks. Obama did not charge Crowley or the Cambridge police with racism.
True, Obama castigated the police for acting ―stupidly,‖ but he tied that to the
decision to arrest a person who had already proved he was in his own home. On
the issue of race and criminal justice, Obama was careful to cabin his point as
―separate and apart from this incident.‖ At most, Obama‘s decision to talk about
Gates‘ arrest and race in the same breath implied a connection—a connection
Obama shied away from explicitly naming. Moreover, when he did discuss race,
Obama objected to a police dynamic related to, yet at some remove from, Gates‘
experience. Obama did not criticize the sort of behavior perhaps demonstrated by
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Crowley—a tendency among police to approach nonwhites, especially men,
primed for a conflict over race and masculine status, and often expressed through
an aggressive disrespect and a quick resort to physical domination. Instead,
Obama chided the persistence of racial profiling, the ―long history in this country
of African-Americans and Latinos being stopped by law enforcement
disproportionately.‖
No doubt racial profiling constitutes a significant problem. Yet it is also
(usually) a politically safe topic. Profiling conjures the image of the innocent
black or brown person, typically someone with a high public profile and
impeccable credentials, stopped and subjected to demeaning questioning for no
reason other than the ―wrong‖ skin color. Contextualizing Gates‘ arrest in terms
of profiling, the Associated Press gave this example: ―Earl Graves Jr., CEO of the
company that publishes Black Enterprise magazine, was once stopped by police
during his train commute to work, dressed in a suit and tie.‖51 The Washington
Post provided another instance: ―Billionaire media and sports entrepreneur Bob
Johnson has described in interviews with The Post his experience [when] he was
stopped by [hotel] security—locked in a revolving door—because a black man
had committed a mugging in the building and they were stopping all black men
coming out of the building.‖52
Gates surely shared with Graves and Johnson an enviable pedigree. As the
Associated Press marveled, ―This was, after all Henry ‗Skip‘ Gates: Summa cum
laude and Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale. MacArthur ‗genius grant‘ recipient.
Acclaimed historian, Harvard professor and PBS documentarian. One of Time
magazine‘s ‗25 Most Influential Americans‘ in 1997. Holder of 50 honorary
degrees.‖
Yet Gates‘ experience lacked the moral clarity—and hence the political
safety—of the classic profiling episode. Instead, the Gates affair involved initially
suspicious behavior and a concerned phone call. It also involved allegations of
class conflict that sought to reverse the usual hierarchy between the white police
officer and the arrested black civilian by pitting an elite Harvard professor against
a working-class cop. As these slight permutations demonstrate, virtually any hint
of culpability—of bad behavior—on the part of arrested minorities may serve for
many to justify abusive police practices. In turn, hints of minority culpability raise
the political costs of remonstrating against police abuse, for it can readily be
portrayed as an attack on honorable police officers and an endorsement of
undeserving and blameworthy troublemakers.
Whatever the distance between the Gates arrest and the stock semiotics of
profiling, however, remember that Obama did not in fact raise a racial objection
to Gates‘ mistreatment. This is the central point. When Obama initially weighed
in on the Gates affair, he did so in an extraordinarily cautious manner. Avoiding
any direct allegation of bias, he did no more than implicitly tie Gates‘ experience
to the patent unfairness of racial profiling, a practice so indisputably objectionable
that President George W. Bush had announced in early 2001, ―It is wrong, and we
will end it in America.‖53
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What Obama did not do, even in his first unscripted remarks, was seize the
moment to spark a much-needed conversation regarding the root causes and stark
consequences of racialized mass incarceration. As Glenn Loury lamented:
It is depressing in the extreme that the president, when it came
time for him to expend political capital on the issue of race and the
police, did so on behalf of his ‗friend‘ rather than stressing policy
reforms that might keep the poorly educated, infrequently
employed, troubled but still human young black men in America
out of prison. This is to say that, if Mr. Obama were going to lose
some working-class white votes to the charge of ‗elitism,‘ I‘d
much rather it have been on countering the proliferation of ‗three
strikes‘ laws, or ratcheting down the federal penalties for low-level
drug trafficking, or inveighing against the racial disproportion in
the administration of the death penalty.‖54
Yet for all his caution, a political conflagration quickly engulfed Obama‘s
comments and, in the face of its heat, he retreated. Two days after his
extemporaneous remarks, Obama explained that while he still considered the
arrest ―an overreaction,‖ he recognized that ―Professor Gates probably
overreacted as well.‖55 Describing his own choice of words as unfortunate,
Obama praised the professionalism of Crowley, and proposed that he, Gates, and
Crowley meet at the White House over beer. The event, subsequently described as
the beer summit, took place at the end of July—with Vice President Joe Biden
invited to sit in at the last minute, likely to avoid a photo shoot featuring two
powerful black men facing down a white cop. The fest seemed to produce little
more than a stiff civility summarized in the following terms by the New York
Times: ―They came, they met, they drank. They did not apologize.‖56
Many of the attacks on Obama, especially those tarring him with the charge of
racism, arose within the parameters of colorblind ideology. Under this framework,
any explicit reference to race amounts to racism, making the person who mentions
race—perhaps Gates, certainly Obama—the racist. Obama did not respond by
reiterating that profiling was a ―fact,‖ let alone by deepening his analysis
regarding the salience of race in the crime control system. Rather, he backed away
from race almost entirely. Not only did he not mention race again, he created a
symmetry between the conduct of Gates and Crowley, and ultimately between
Crowley and himself. As all three sat down for a beer, each seemed equally
innocent of anything more than a shared propensity to ―overreact.‖ In this context,
post-racialism can be understood as a rhetorical response to colorblindness. In the
face of a charge that colorblindness has been violated by the mention of race,
post-racialism retorts that race is not a factor at all.
Moving from the rhetorical to the pragmatic level, Obama‘s reaction to the
brouhaha also reflects a core tenet of post-racialism: race should not be allowed to
become a distraction from issues ostensibly both more important and more
amenable to political resolution. As Obama wryly observed in the same press
conference in which he walked back his initial comments, ―I don‘t know if any of
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you‘ve noticed, but [in the last few days] nobody has been paying much attention
to health care.‖57 Obama‘s post-racial retreat should give us pause. As both
rhetoric and strategy, post-racialism responds to colorblindness by adopting the
latter‘s basic message, that race is irrelevant.
VII. Post-Racialism as Liberal Colorblindness
While a chasm separates the social visions of Obama and those who so quickly
castigated him as a racist, when measured in terms of racial politics this distance
shrinks disconcertingly. To understand this, reconsider colorblindness and postracialism as racial frameworks that seek to answer the following questions: (1)
What is—and is not—race?, (2) What is—and is not—racism?, and (3) what is
the relationship between race, racism, and inequality, and by implication, what
does justice require?
To provide a baseline, we might start by postulating the following points: First,
race is socially constructed.58 Yes, when in relative reproductive isolation, small
groups of humans, for either geographical or cultural reasons, tend to share
physical similarities. But this is not the same thing as saying that the overarching
categories of white, black, brown, yellow, red, and so on reflect basic biological
divisions. Humanity has been sundered into races not by nature but by historically
contingent, culturally specific beliefs and practices.
Second, the process of dividing humans into supposedly descent-based
hierarchies arose in conjunction with and in service to group-based exploitation.
In other words, racism involves, on the one hand, the arrogation of resources
through exploitation and efforts to preserve past illegitimate acquisitions, and on
the other, justificatory efforts rooted in the manipulation of ideas of fundamental
racial difference.
Third, as a result of their role in validating oppression, racial categories are
imbued with social meanings and assumptions, whether about group culture,
ability, values, or temperament. Fourth, these meanings explain (even as they
receive support from) racial inequalities entrenched in the material reality of our
society. The stereotype of most whites as honest, industrious, and ambitious
contrasts with the calumny that most blacks and browns are thievish, lazy, and
contented. In turn, these racial meanings seem to explain the distance between
suburbs, ghettoes, and barrios, even as this distance solidifies the seemingly
obvious ―truth‖ of these patent lies.
This conception blurs the line between race and racism. The meanings
associated with race inevitably draw on notions of racial hierarchy, just as they
justify and in turn are justified by the entrenched inequalities generated by racist
practices. This conflation recalls the key insight captured in the early colorblind
arguments of Thurgood Marshall that racism involves oppression and exploitation
sanctified through the social construction of races. (It does not, of course, suggest
the opposite, that all racial distinctions necessarily result in racial subordination.)
This conception of race and racism is not offered to supplant more individualist
notions of racism as involving, for instance, the virulent expression of racist
hatreds or the cooler dynamics of cognitive bias. Nor is it intended to suggest the
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primacy of more structural or institutional models of racism, for example those
stressing deeply entrenched material inequalities and the inertial tendencies of
privilege and disadvantage, even absent prejudiced actors. Rather, the point is to
highlight the overarching dynamic of race and racism. Obviously, race works on
many levels, not all oppressive, and racism often takes multiple forms, from
conscious to cognitive to institutional. Yet at root, after serving for centuries to
legitimize group exploitation, race and racism function today as deeply embedded
expressions of group hierarchy.
Neither colorblindness nor post-racialism see race and racism this way. To
begin with, both tend to divorce race from racism, and to understand race as little
more than skin color. Colorblindness takes this position a bit further, seeing race
as exclusively a matter of integument. In turn, this facilitates a colorblind
understanding of racism as involving every express use of race. Because race by
definitional fiat lacks all social meaning, colorblindness is able to present every
use of race as equally without justification. To take cognizance of race, whether to
segregate or to integrate, is ostensibly to treat people differently on the basis of an
arbitrary characteristic that lacks social relevance and over which individuals have
no control. Notice that this vision comprehends racism in individual and
symmetrical terms; individual in that racism harms the person classified by race,
and symmetrical in that nothing distinguishes the group positions of whites and
nonwhites. Thus, affirmative action becomes ―reverse discrimination.‖ The
exclusion of minorities under white supremacy differs not at all from the
preference given them in furtherance of social repair. In the words of Clarence
Thomas, ―government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice
is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each
instance, it is racial discrimination pure and simple.‖59 To recapitulate, under
colorblindness, race is only skin color; it is not a categorical system constructed
over a long history of group-based exploitation. Racism is any and every use of
race; it has nothing to do with the imposition or defense of a racial hierarchy.
Post-racialism does not take such a hard line. It sees race not just as skin color,
but as a historical artifact that gives race contemporary relevance. In the midst of
the presidential campaign, Obama was thrown on the ropes by an uproar over
some of the racial statements of his pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright. Choosing
the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia as the venue in which to respond,
Obama delivered a speech widely credited with saving his candidacy by offering a
nuanced, compelling engagement with the continued pain of race. In doing so, he
drew on a historically grounded vision:
Legalized discrimination—where blacks were prevented, often
through violence, from owning property, or loans were not granted
to African-American business owners, or black homeowners could
not access FHA mortgages, or blacks were excluded from unions,
or the police force, or fire departments—meant that black families
could not amass any meaningful wealth to bequeath to future
generations. That history helps explain the wealth and income gap
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between black and white, and the concentrated pockets of poverty
that persists in so many of today‘s urban and rural communities.60
According to this insight, race carries social relevance today because of
yesterday‘s discrimination. Thus, to talk of race is not, as in the colorblind
conception, to commit the moral offense of racism, but rather to recognize a sorry
history and its continuing legacy.
Nevertheless, post-racial thinking does not draw upon this memory of past and
pervasive mistreatment in conceptualizing contemporary racism. Instead, in the
post-racial vernacular, racism seems only to refer to individual bigotry. In one
version of this, Obama in his Philadelphia oratory criticized ―[t]alk show hosts
and conservative commentators [who] built entire careers unmasking bogus
claims of racism while dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and
inequality as mere political correctness or reverse racism.‖61 Obama correctly
chastened colorblind partisans for alleging reverse racism every time someone
seeks to raise the continued specter of race. But in doing so, he seemed to accept
that claims about ―racial injustice and inequality‖ might amount to ―bogus claims
of racism.‖ Obama presents contemporary inequality as merely a vestige of the
past, an inertial legacy of otherwise defeated history. The perpetuation of gross
disparities—whether through commission or omission—does not count as an
evolving form of racism. In another version of this, Obama rejected any role for
race in the government‘s laggardly response to Hurricane Katrina, blaming
instead ―colorblind incompetence.‖
The implication that racism amounts only to personal prejudice is strengthened
by the way in which Obama frequently reverts to the technique of symmetry. We
have previously seen how he equated the ―overreaction‖ of Gates and Crowley,
and implicitly of himself. This technique was already much in evidence in
Philadelphia, where Obama created parallels between white and black prejudice.
He made congruent the outrage expressed by Wright and the prejudice harbored
by his own white grandmother, linking ―the bitterness and bias that make up [part
of] the black experience in America‖ with ―a woman who loves me as much as
she loves anything in this world, but a woman who once confessed her fear of
black men who passed by her on the street, and who on more than one occasion
has uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes that made me cringe.‖62 Perhaps more
powerfully, Obama also equated black resentment and white anger. Because this
equation not only made symmetrical the outlooks of blacks and whites in the
United States, but did so by validating the backlash politics that justified
racialized mass incarceration, it bears quoting at some length. After explaining
that black resentment must be understood in the context of a legacy of racial
mistreatment, Obama continued:
[A] similar anger exists within segments of the white community.
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don‘t feel that
they have been particularly privileged by their race. Their
experience is the immigrant experience—as far as they‘re
concerned, no one‘s handed them anything, they‘ve built it from
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scratch. They‘ve worked hard all their lives, many times only to
see their jobs shipped overseas or their pension dumped after a
lifetime of labor. They are anxious about their futures, and feel
their dreams slipping away; in an era of stagnant wages and global
competition, opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum game, in
which your dreams come at my expense. So when they are told to
bus their children to a school across town; when they hear that an
African American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or
a spot in a good college because of an injustice that they
themselves never committed; when they’re told that their fears
about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudiced,
resentment builds over time.
Like the anger within the black community, these resentments
aren‘t always expressed in polite company. But they have helped
shape the political landscape for at least a generation. Anger over
welfare and affirmative action helped forge the Reagan Coalition.
Politicians routinely exploited fears of crime for their own
electoral ends. . . . And yet, to wish away the resentments of white
Americans, to label them as misguided or even racist, without
recognizing they are grounded in legitimate concerns—this too
widens the racial divide, and blocks the path to understanding.63
Post-racialism understands racism as individual bias and bigotry, something
practiced symmetrically and with equal facility by whites and minorities. It rejects
(or at least avoids any mention of) the notion that racism is rooted in
asymmetrical group hierarchy. It ignores the way race plays out through efforts to
preserve illegitimate group advantage, for instance through opposition to school
integration or to affirmative action in employment or higher education contexts. It
uncritically accepts and even seems to endorse efforts to harness group anxieties
about declining racial status, treating the backlash politics that drove opposition to
welfare and favored increased policing of minority communities as expressions of
―legitimate concern.‖ Committed to a model of racism as private bias, postracialism legitimates rather than challenges the dynamics that produced racialized
mass incarceration.
VIII. Race and Public Policy
What, then, of the relationship between race, racism, and inequality? Here again
slight differences mask fundamental agreement. Having stripped race and racism
of almost all content, colorblindness would seem unable to explain the continued
correlation between race and inequality in the United States. It resolves this
dilemma by recourse to the notion of group cultures. Though colorblindness
pictures race as empty of content, it also, contradictorily, conceptualizes races as
associated with cultures. Recall that colorblindness facilitates discussions of
group attributes in behavioral and cultural terms, excusing such stereotyping as
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―not-racism‖ as long as biology is not explicitly invoked. In turn, this narrative
answers the question of continued group inequality thusly: groups have earned
their relative advantage, or deserve their relative disadvantage, because of
choices, values, and abilities inherent in the groups themselves. In this light, to
seek to alter the maldistribution of privilege and hardship is to engage in
illegitimate ―social engineering,‖ taking from those who value hard work to
reward those with an entitlement mentality.64 In the face of inequality rationalized
as legitimate, warranted, earned, and deserved, colorblindness tells us society is
morally forbidden to do anything to ameliorate the situation.
Post-racialism does not explain the connection between race and inequality in
terms of failed minority cultures, but instead by reference to past discrimination.
Yet, this does not translate into an obligation to specifically remedy persistent
harms to minorities, for example in education, housing, health care, or
disproportionately high rates of incarceration. Post-racialism does not posit that
specifically seeking to remediate harms to minorities is immoral, as in the
colorblind version. But it does contend that such efforts are pragmatically unwise.
In his 2006 book, The Audacity of Hope, Obama argued that, ―[a]n emphasis on
universal, as opposed to race-specific, programs isn‘t just good policy; it‘s good
politics.‖65 To explain this position, he recounted a formative experience while
sitting in the Illinois senate, listening to a black colleague from an inner-city
district decry racism, only to have a liberal white colleague lean over and explain,
―You know what the problem is with John? Whenever I hear him, he makes me
feel more white.‖66 Calling his white colleague‘s comments ―instructive,‖ Obama
drew the following lesson: ―Rightly or wrongly, white guilt has largely exhausted
itself in America; even the most fair-minded whites, those who would genuinely
like to see racial inequality ended and poverty relieved, tend to push back against
suggestions of racial victimization—or race-specific claims based on the history
of race discrimination in this country.‖67 The implication, for Obama, is that
social justice should be pursued not through ―proposals that solely benefit
minorities and dissect Americans into ‗us‘ and ‗them,‘‖ but through ―universal
appeals that help all Americans (schools that teach, jobs that pay, health care for
everyone who needs it, a government that helps out after a flood) . . . even if such
strategies disproportionately help minorities.‖68 As president, Obama has recently
reiterated this position: ―I can‘t pass laws that say I‘m just helping black folks.
I‘m the president of the United States. What I can do is make sure that I am
passing laws that help all people, particularly those who are most vulnerable and
most in need. That in turn is going to help lift up the African-American
community.‖69
Colorblindness and post-racialism differ fundamentally. Quite frankly, the
present incarnation of colorblindness seems geared to preserving a status quo of
continued white dominance—dominance, not supremacy. ―White dominance‖
invokes a sociological understanding of group social, economic, and political
position. It points toward the reality of racialized mass incarceration; to disparities
in access to adequate housing, schools, and healthcare; to startling differences in
economic security. Black median wealth currently stands at $6,000 and Latino
median net worth at $8,000, while white median net worth is $88,000. In contrast,
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―white supremacy‖ recalls a particular racial ideology that justified dominance
through bald claims about racial superiority and inferiority. The great triumph of
the civil rights era lies in the defeat of white supremacy, not only as a set of ideas
but in its most egregious practices. In turn, colorblindness stakes its claim to
moral legitimacy on the basis of a robust repudiation of these defeated ideas. But
the overthrow of white supremacy did not dismantle white dominance. On the
contrary, as the current differences in wealth—and, more pointedly, in rates of
incarceration—demonstrate, white dominance continues. Contemporary
colorblindness defends such inequality by forestalling race-conscious
remediation, by providing cover for stereotypical rationalizations masked in
cultural and behavioral terms, and by attacking as racists all those who speak
forthrightly about continuing racial distortions.
The post-racialism of Barack Obama is a million miles from this sort of
ideological defense of inequality. His racial sensibility speaks movingly about the
past injustices wrought in the name of race and to the current devastation of many
minority communities. Discussing blighted neighborhoods in his adopted
hometown of Chicago, Obama strongly rejects the explanation offered by
conservative think tanks, the colorblind rhetoric that blames ―cultural
pathologies—rather than racism or structural inequalities.‖70 For Obama, these
desperate places tell:
the stories of those who didn‘t make it out of history‘s
confinement, of the neighborhoods within the black community
that house the poorest of the poor, serving as repositories for all the
scars of slavery and violence of Jim Crow, the internalized rage
and the forced ignorance, the shame of men who could not protect
their women or support their families, the children who grew up
being told they wouldn‘t amount to anything and had no one there
to undo the damage.71
And yet, for however powerful his insight and however heartfelt his empathy,
Obama‘s post-racial politics take him to a terminus close to that of the colorblind
ideology he otherwise rejects. Post-racialism reduces racism to individual,
unreconstructed bigotry. It rejects the argument that racism also describes
structural practices, deeply entrenched cultural beliefs among whites, or political
efforts to mobilize the electorate to vote its racial fears. By truncating the meaning
of racism, post-racialism helps diffuse our moral responsibility to directly
challenge these dimensions of race as well as the persistent inequality they
produce and protect. Instead, like colorblindness (if for very different reasons),
post-racialism tells us to eschew the divisive politics of race-conscious efforts,
and instead urges that we throw our weight behind universal solutions to the
nation‘s ills. More than thirty years ago, responding to the ascendance of a
colorblind legal regime that increasingly turned its back on just outcomes, Alan
Freeman trenchantly warned, ―The net effect is that the victim of racial
discrimination must persevere until the utopian day when everyone is entitled to
distributive justice.‖72 Is the net effect of post-racialism very different?
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IX. Conclusion
The previous question need not be treated as a rhetorical one. We should ask
whether Obama might not be correct that universalism is good politics. Is it
possible that Obama can get us closer to racial justice by not talking about race?
This question treats post-racialism as a matter of strategy, rather than as a
framework for substantively conceptualizing race, racism, and inequality.
Imagine, it says, the not far-fetched idea that Obama understands race and racism
in group hierarchical terms, but has made the calculated decision to offer a more
palliative vision in the hope of pushing a racial justice agenda further. Is it clear
that he is wrong to do so? Framed in this way, let me acknowledge uncertainty.
As a strategic response to recalcitrance among whites to dismantle the edifices of
racial privilege, perhaps post-racialism is the better bet. Especially in light of the
conflagration that followed Obama‘s tepid remarks about Gates‘ arrest, it is
entirely plausible that a more direct engagement with racism and its legacies
would achieve less. Thus, to be clear, my objection is not to post-racialism as a
maneuver. Nor do I object to a certain amount of public dissimulation about race
by racial change advocates. In the face of deep commitments to the racial status
quo, it behooves leaders and activists alike to be strategic about how we pitch
calls for much-needed change.
My concern, rather, is with post-racialism as a racial ideology, as an
unexamined way to understand and act in response to race in our society. Obama
may or may not embrace post-racialism in this way. Yet many of the folks he is
speaking to do view race this way. In couching his remarks in post-racial terms,
he not only appeals to a sentiment already present in the body politic, he
legitimates and strengthens this zeitgeist. Return for the last time to the subject of
racialized mass incarceration. Obama seems prepared to do nothing about it, and
perhaps as a practical matter that is the correct political choice. Yet it is hard to
swallow a decision to ignore the continuation of such rank injustice, and I
strenuously object, even as I recognize that attempting to redress mass
imprisonment head-on might produce more backlash than positive change. But it
should be possible to take strategic, even ostensibly non-racial or universal
approaches, to racial remediation, without promoting a post-racial narrative.
My deepest concern, then, is the use of post-racial framing in a way that fosters
a liberal parallel to colorblindness. This sort of post-racialism tells us that
racialized mass incarceration is not, in fact, a rank injustice. Post-racialism, even
as given voice by Obama, limits racism to individual bias and dismisses the racial
politics of anti-welfarism and the war on crime as responses to ―legitimate
concerns.‖ For those who accept this perspective, racialized mass incarceration
becomes little more than yet another lingering vestige of past discrimination, a
statistical distortion to be remedied someday, when finally a ―universal‖ appeal
convinces whites that they too have an interest in not sending to prison one in
every three young black men without a high school degree.
In The Audacity of Hope, Obama poignantly notes that as a society we now
indifferently accept dramatic racial injustices. He writes, ―Black men filling our
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prisons, black children unable to read or caught in a gangland shooting, the black
homeless sleeping on grates and in the parks of our nation‘s capital—we take
these things for granted, as part of the national order, a tragic situation, perhaps,
but not one for which we are culpable, and certainly not something subject to
change.‖73 Post-racialism does not challenge this indifference, this sense that we
are not responsible for, or capable of, remedying racial injustice. It rather
reassures us that there is no injustice there to be remedied. Surely such expiation
can only delay racial justice.
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